in the Cleaner Production program, whose main appeal is cost reduction through modifications in the procedures and in the production technology. ISO14000 privileges the standardization of productive and administrative practices so that they become correctly executed, i.e. efficient. This is achieved through workers' training on new practices that are less environmentally aggressive.
Concerns related to measuring environmental management system results, particularly through waste generation and energy consumption indicators, reflect the concern with achieving the established performance standard. The presentation of indicators to the board of directors has demonstrated the importance of production efficiency as a factor in the maintenance or expansion of environmental investments.
Since efficiency and productivity concepts are strongly related, greater production efficiency may lead to greater productivity. On the one hand, attention to the method employed in task execution leads to resource savings, be them labor, energy, raw materials or equipment usage; on the other hand, such greater efficiency when allied to greater productivity may result in greater resource consumption due to the increase in the company's productivity. Although the company activities might be considered less environmentally aggressive from a process-based standpoint, they might not result in a reduction of the company's environmental impacts from a global perspective.
SIMON AND THE EFFICIENCY CRITERION
According to Simon (1965) , social sciences do not have as precise mechanisms as those owned by natural sciences. Efficiency in administrative decisions is a concept "almost identical to the concept of utility maximization in the economic theory" (SIMON, 1965, p. 211) . Efficiency is related to the existence of scarce resources, and the activities involve the comparability of reference values. Therefore, "the efficiency criterion determines the choice of alternatives that lead to the maximization of results when scarce resources are applied" (SIMON, 1965, p. 209) . However, alternatives cannot be exhausted because the decision maker does not have the necessary computational power and only owns incomplete information; besides many alternatives do not represent and adequate solution. Therefore the search of an alternative must be based on previous knowledge about the domain at stake. The decision is made when one of the alternatives presents a satisfactory item, achieving an expectation level formed on the basis of past experiences and one that allows a judgment on decision quality. However, the expectation level must be adjusted as a function of the parameters found in the domain and during the unfolding of the situation, parameters that do not refer to utility only (SIMON, 1992) . The efficiency criterion consists of a common denominator among the values considered in decision making and corresponds to the predominant criterion in rational decisions. However, the efficiency criterion is neutral: it does not solve the value comparison problem.
Since the administrative activity is groupal in nature, its identification with the values of an organized group, an organization, orients it according to the organizational objectives, not according to myriad human values. Ethical premises of the organization constitute the organization's objectives (SIMON, 1965) . The organizational roles assumed by individuals connect them to organizational objectives, which can be independent from personal objectives (SIMON, 1964 (SIMON, , 1986 . The individual differences explain the different behaviors during the execution of a given role and during the decision making process.
When the organization provides the decision maker with fundamental values, it restricts his or her choices. Therefore, for commercial organizations and used an expression used by Simon (1965 Simon ( , 1964 , the fundamental premise corresponds to profit and decisions are oriented to maximize income or minimize cost. Money corresponds to the common denominator that allows the choice of one alternative among the many available.
As described by Simon (1965) , rationality is limited. According to this view, the administrative man operates in a complex world, but his perception is simple. Therefore, he compromises, since he cannot maximize. Decisions seek a satisfactory action course, for previous examination or knowledge of all alternatives is not doable. Thus, efficiency is related to the satisfactory action course.
SIMON AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT?
The environmental management activities present in a company are directed by the values and policies established by the company. According to Simon (1965) , preestablished values serve to limit the decision maker choices, since such values represent the organization's objectives. Their clear establishment hinders the decision maker from considering all values that are present in a community or in his memory. Thus decision is made on the basis of a more restrict number of alternatives.
Alternatives are further restricted when one deals with profit-oriented commercial organizations. Organizational objectives are established via authority and communication channels. In general, quality programs require as a fundamental step, the commitment from the top management, not only for the liberation of investments, but also for the establishment of an environmental policy, the latter based on a set of values, i.e., organizational objectives. This was verified in the studied companies. Since they were profit-seeking organizations, it is natural to have profit as the decision-guiding factor.
This partly explains why environmental activities in the studied companies are directed to costs minimization or to the discovery of business opportunities, practices that not necessarily transform polluting programs. The decisions do not question whether the goals are ethical or not, for this was established while discussing organizational values and the environmental policy defined by the top management.
However, decisions are made on the basis of limited rationality. Choices are satisfactory. Therefore, decisions are also guided by intrinsic values learned by each one of the decision makers. In the case studies, it was observed that all companies went through an initial phase, in which employee culture change is attempted. Trainings are used not only as a means of teaching new procedures but also to highlight the importance of the environment, health, safety and the well-being of the employees, the company and the community itself.
The preoccupation described as productive efficiency places economic gains derived from new practices and opportunities at the center of environmental management. The emphasis on competitiveness is evident; as quoted in more than one interview: national and international markets may require a proof that the company is seeking impact reduction. This means that the profit dimension governs environmental management. The question that cannot be answered by this study is whether organizations would maintain their environmental practices in detriment of profit reduction, thus revealing an influence of environmental values that are not linked to profitability.
ECONOMY OF TRANSACTION COSTS
From the 70's, institutionalism has undergone a set of transformations in its economic, sociological and political facets (CARVALHO, GOULART and VIEIRA, 2004) . Although the interests on sociological and political aspects are invaluable to the analysis of environmental questions, this work opted for a discussion of the economic aspect of neo-institutionalism, based on the economy of transaction costs, because, during the research, it was clear the importance placed by the interviewees on the profitability associated to environmental practices.
Cost transaction economy represents one of the most recent developments in theory of the firm, inaugurated by the classical theory but reconfigured by t he work of Ronald Coase, in 1937 : The nature of the firm. In order to answer why firms exist and what determines their actions, Coase introduced the concept of transaction costs. They correspond to research and information costs, bargaining and decision costs and control costs, present in a transaction. According to Coase (1988a) , economy traditionally considered the price mechanism as responsible for the coordination of the economic system.
The only reason for the establishment of a firm is the existence of costs of use of price mechanisms: price identification costs, negotiation costs and contracting costs. The contracts for the conduction of firm activities via process mechanisms are replace by a smaller number of contracts inside the firm, e.g. contracts among the employer and his employees. They are long-term contracts in order to avoid negotiation and renewal costs. Under these conditions, the buyer (owner) becomes responsible for the resource allocation and avoids market costs. This allows the appearance of the firm (COASE, 1988a), i.e. one may say that firms are alternative forms of organization and that they only exist when such organization is cheaper than another that would be achieved through market mechanisms.
Uncertainty is another essential condition for firm creation. Absence of uncertainty means that information is perfect for all individuals, without opportunities for the coordination of productive activities (KNIGHT apud COASE, 1988a) . If all individuals knew everything about a certain situation, there would be no space for an alternative organization form, because there would be no leeway for different transaction costs. In a different work entitled The problem of social cost, in 1960, Coase deals with firm actions that harm others, such as pollution. These negative effects of one firm on another are called externalities. Within the neo-classic economic theory, externalities are solved according to the work of Pigou (1960) : through the responsabilization of the producer via taxes and fines in proportion to the harm caused. For Coase (1988b) , the pollution problem is reciprocal in nature. If A provokes a nocive effect on B, avoiding B's problem may harm A. The solution should consider the total cost of pollution minimization.
The works of Coase started the new institutional economy. Following Coase's work on transaction costs and property rights, Oliver Williamson developed the Transaction Cost Economy (TCE) maintaining the emphasis on the importance of firm coordination activities, the market and property rights. For Williamson (1996 Williamson ( , 1998 , the firm is a governance structure. In the TCE, firms and markets represent alternative forms of governance and the distribution of activities among them stems from the institutional environment. What is governance, however? According to Williamson (2002, p.180) : "Governance is the means by which to infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and to realize "the most fundamental of all understandings in economics", mutual gain from voluntary exchange".
Williamson follows North's definition of institutions: "institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constrains that shape human interaction" (NORTH, 1990, p. 3) . Institutions reduce uncertainty, because they provide support for daily activities. Therefore, the institutional environment and governance institutions play a very important role in the industrial organization (WILLIAMSON, 1996) . In order to succeed, as organization needs to adapt itself to the environment (WILLIAMSON, 1998) . This also influences vertical integration, for, according to Williamson (2002) , since transactions differ in their attributes and governance structures differ in costs and competences, transactions must be aligned with appropriate governance structures. Besides Coase's influence, TCE resorts to Simon's notion of limited rationality The latter directly influences the elaboration of contracts, which are considered intrinsically incomplete (WILLIAMSON, 1996 (WILLIAMSON, , 1998 BOERNER e MACHER, 2005) . Apart from the problems associated to the impossibility of foreseeing all situations associated to a transaction during contract closure, one must consider the opportunistic behavior of the agents. Ex ante governance is essential to avoid ex post opportunism problems. Instead of the satisfying, derived from limited rationality, CTE seeks the economizing. Economizing refers to reducing waste, burocracy and other types of adaptation losses; it aims at better contractual alignment, organization, incentives and controls. (WILLIAMSON, 1996) . TCE presents three levels that transact and are responsible for the firm's governance structure. The institutional environment, which influences the form and its governance structures and which, in its turn, affects the individual. The reverse path is also valid for the TCE (WILLIAMSON, 1996) . Transaction costs, according to North (1990) , derive not only from the inefficiency of property rights stemming from the institutional environment,, but also from the imperfect mind models of the agents when they try to understand the complexity of routine problems. North considers human motivation as more complex than the utility maximization model and states that culture change is necessary to define the path representing greater efficiency.
TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT? SOMETHING NOT SO STRANGE ...
Regarding environmental management the question is: what are the game rules in regard to the environment? There are two main components here: making money, the objective of any capitalist enterprise, and being concerned with the environment. However, according to the practices described by the studied companies, both are intrinsically connected.
The presence of environmental inspection bodies, like FEPAM, and the consequent possibility of fines for bad environmental behavior prod companies towards the adoption of environmental management processes. However, following Coase's reasoning on social cost, taxes and fines are not enough to curb negative externalities such as pollution. Even governmental administration has its costs and the system efficiency can be affected. Therefore, market mechanisms aimed at the inclusion of environmental norms have been increasingly preferred. The reasoning privileges the economic view both from the active and from the passive subjects, avoiding fines, reducing costs or improving the company's image. The value that guides environmental preoccupation is income maximization, from which the need of clear property rights regarding the environment stems. This generates a conflict with the views regarding the environment as a public good (HARDIN, 1968) .
The profit component seems to have a greater importance as a "game rule", since the adoption of practices that stretch beyond what is required by law suffices to the objective of saving resources and attending present and future market demands. The market assumes a capital importance for it considers the existence of consumers who value products and services that are less environmentally aggressive. This involves not only purchase relations but also the company's image as environmentally non-aggressive, a fact that may avoid transaction costs. Partnerships developed with universities, and with the National Center of Clean Technologies, may represent a step towards a more effective insertion of environmental values in organizations.
Various governance structures were found in the researched companies. One of the companies, for example, sought long-term contracts, actively participating in suppliers environmental audits, whereas others simply controlled their suppliers through a set of preestablished requirements, like operations licenses issued and renewed by FEPAM, as a means of avoiding control costs. The common denominator to all companies where indepth interviews occurred is the existence of an engineering staff, which is responsible for the environmental area, in hierarchically distinct levels. The engineers work with human resource and product development professionals, indicating an adaptation to the complex institutional environment represented by ecological requirements.
Regarding customers, one notices sometimes an opportunistic behavior. For example, a PVC producer states that its product is recyclable, but does not reveal that PVC has carcinogenic substances, the reason for the ban on PVC toys and medical products in Europe (a ban that can be extended to other consumption goods).
DISCOURSE, POWER AND ENVIRONMENT
Discourse promotes and reflects power relations. It is simultaneously a text, a discursive practice and a social practice. The text dimension refers to linguistic analysis; the practical dimension is related to the nature of production processes and textual interpretation, namely, the types of discourse and their combinations; the social practice dimension refers to the institutional and organizational context and its influence on the discursive practice. The discursive practice focuses on the concepts of ideology and hegemony that are produced, reproduced and transformed in the discourse (FAIRCLOUGH, 2001) . For Foucault (2004), power is not found in a single aspect, but in power correlations that generate different ever-unstable states of power. These relations of power are expressed and constituted in the discourse. Therefore, discourse is the power that is to be seized.
For Hardy e Phillips (1999), discourse produces concepts that are ideas that represent our view of the world. Concepts can be transformed in time and with respect too the situation producing them, disseminated and interpreted by different social agents. These concepts do not live in harmony. Much to the contrary, they are source of disputes among the agents seeking their legitimacy and hegemony. Different concepts evoke different objects and involve different practices to deal with this object.
According to Olivo and Misoczky (2003) , in the environmental discourse presented in the Brundtland report, there is a predominance of economic logic to determine the concept of sustainable development and strategic actions of sustainability. The logic of life preservation was left in second place. Springett (2003) points that the term sustainable development is confused with other concepts and with the very notion of sustainable development. Government members, NGO and companies use concepts such as triple bottom line, sustainability, sustainable management, sustainable grow, and ecoefficience as synonyms.
The confusion is also a reflection of the dispute among agents. This reflects the importance of symbolic power in the establishment of game rules. According to Bourdieu, there are three fundamental types of capital: economic, social and cultural. To them one may add symbolic capital, which corresponds to the form assumed by the other types when understood as perception categories that recognize a specific logic or do not recognize the arbitrariness of its possession or accumulation. Symbolic capital connects to the individual and to space where he dwells through discourse. Therefore, environmental discourse and its different interpretations and uses involve the understanding of environmental practices not only as efficient ones, but also as those that are better situated in the power space involving governmental agencies, NGOs and society.
POWER SIGHS
The works of Foucault and Bourdieu were used as an inspiration because the data collected within a positivist paradigm and with other purposes do not facilitate a more detailed analysis. However, these theories were chosen in order to indicate that new useful insights about our relationship with nature are possible.
During in-depth interviews it was possible to identify the green business discourse and a lack of questioning about the ecological limits, since environmental questions were considered efficiency issues linked to processes and profitability. The preoccupation with the company image is also clear in the discourse. The economic growth and free market ideologies are not questioned in the company, nor by the company representatives, and the environmental discourse is one of transformation and responsibility towards future generations.
It was possible to observe clashes between FEPAM and companies. The latter stated that the former does not participate in the solution of environmental problems, only inspecting and fining. Although not explicitly mentioned by the interviewees, clashes also exist inside companies, between environmental staff and the board, among different departments and among different job positions. In the first case, environmental performance indicators are used as a power resource to convince top management of the utility of environmental practices; among departments practices and environment consciousness disseminators are mobilized, whereas at the individual level, each employee seeks to enlarge his or her family environmental awareness level.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
It is important to stress that this work has not aimed at presenting complementary theories, but different views of the same question. Moreover, the economic approach was favored for it still is a cornerstone in the environmental practices of companies, as noticed in the interviews. This does not mean that the sociological and political approaches are not interesting. On the contrary, their sue in the development of new studies is essential to widen the understanding of the relationships among society, economy and environment.
Organizational theories that are directed to economic explanations such as those discussed in this study, reveal the importance of the economic aspect in environmental issues, but also point to its limitations. As already mentioned in the introduction, naturesociety relations have a complexity that stretch beyond economic explanations. One is led into inquiring whether management practices based on efficiency or the economizing, such as ISO14000, PML and other market mechanisms may lead to sustainable development or may represent the maintenance of old environmentally aggressive management practices, specially when profitability level is at stake. These economic explanations and their associated management practices do not seem to respond to the necessary changes in nature-society relations as pointed by the United Nations (UN MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, 2005), the World Bank (WDR, 2003) and the Worldwatch Institute. Other theories and world views need to be mobilized so the one can better understand nature-society relations.
It was difficult to analyze the data obtained, because they were collected without considering the different theories presented herein. This was particularly relevant during the analysis of the agents' opportunistic behavior and the environmental discourse and associated power relations. 
